Net national product as a welfare indicator by Brekke, Kjell Arne
i
Discussion Paper
Central Bureau of Statistics, P.B. 8131 Dip, 0033 Oslo 1, Norway
No. 65	 October, 1991




Weitzman (1976) claimed that in the case of linear utility, NNP ia
proportional to welfare, defined as the discounted value of future util-
ity. We first demonstrate that this theory only applies to economies
with stationary economic policy and no technical progress. Farther-
more Weitzman's result does not generalize to the case of nonlinear
utility.
We also prove that only under the assumption of unchanged eco-
nomic policy and with constant shadow value of investment is marginal
changes in NNP a measure of marginal changes in welfare. Thus the
theory gives no justification of attempts to maximize NNP growth.
Finally we point out that levels or growth rates of NNP for different
countries, is no indicator of relative welfare or the relative success of
economic policy.
In the last part of the paper we discuss national wealth as a po-
tential  welfare measure. We point out that in a small open economy,
welfare will be an increasing function of national wealth. Unfortu-
nately, this will no longer be true if we relax the assumption that the
economy is small and open.
1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to consider the theoretical foundations for
NNP as a welfare measure. This is an important basis for the discussion of
extensions of NNP to include changes in environmental quality or the nations
resource base.
Environmental resources are crucial for economic development. In spite of
this fact, a standard measure of economic development, the national product,
takes no account of changes in a country's resource base. This has led to the
claim that NNP or GNP should be changed to account for the changes in
environmental resource base. It is, however, not obvious that this is the best
response to the problem. No single measure can give a complete account of
the development of a complex body like a national economy. For simplicity
and overview of the development, it is preferable with few measures. On
the other hand, aggregating things that do not belong together will not add
clarity.
The claim that NNP or GNP should be extended has got considerable at-
tention from non—economists. Postel (1990) argues for including development
of environmental variables in GNP, but she provides no economic theory to
guide us to what kind of conclusions we can draw from this redefined GNP.
Still the lack of account for environmental variables in GNP is taken as ev-
idence that economist ignore environmental problems. This illustrates the
symbolic importance of national accounting figures. The separation of na-
tional product and indicators of the development in environmental resource
base, indicates that a good environment is a costly luxury good, rather than
an important input for the economy. I consider this as a very important
point, but a further discussion will unfortunately be beyond the scope of this
paper.
To give an outline of the paper: In section 2 we will present a result
due to Weitzman (1976). He proved that in an economy with infinite lived
agents with perfect foresight and linear utility, NNP is proportional to wel-
fare defined as the discounted value of the infinite stream of utility for the
representative agent. We will demonstrate that this is only true with sta-
tionary technology, wish excludes dynamic economic policy and technical
progress. We will also point out that NNP as defined in Weitzman (1976)
does not correspond to either real or nominal NNP, since it is calculated at
current prices in utility units. We will also prove that the result cannot be
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generalized to the case of non-linear utility.
In section 3 we consider the possibility of using marginal changes in NNP
as a measure of marginal changes in welfare. We demonstrate that the change
in NNP will not measure the changes in welfare due to a marginal change
in policy. Furthermore, NNP growth is only a measure of changes in welfare
under the assumption that economic policy is unchanged and that the rate
of return is equal to the discount rate. Finally we show that we NNP from
different countries is not a measure of relative welfare.
In section 4 we discuss the definition and properties of national wealth,
and in section 5 we show that if all prices are exogenous, then welfare is a
increasing function of wealth. In section 6 we will argue that the assumption
of exogenous prices cannot be relaxed. Section 7 summarizes the results and
concludes that NNP is not a welfare measure in any reasonable sense.
2 NNP and the level of welfare
We will start with the result from Weitzman (1976). The result states that in
a Ramsey model with linear utility, NNP is proportional to the present value
of the optimal consumption stream. I.e., Consider the problem of choosing
consumption and investment to find
14(Kt) = max C(s)e-r (")ds, (1)
subject to 
(Ct,kt) E S(K), (2)
where k = --dft . The set S(K), is the technology, wish only depends upon
Kt , and is independent of t. The problem can be interpreted as the optimal
consumption problem for a representative agent with linear utility. Weitzman
(1976) proved that there exist competitive prices Pt such that
rV(Kt) + ptkt* = Yi*, (3)
where C* and K* is the optimal solution to (1) and (2).
It is well known that the optimal solution for the representative agent is
equal to the competitive solution in a decentralized economy. Hence the com-
petitive prices pt is equivalent the adjoint variables from the corresponding
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optimal control problem, and hence Yt* is equal to the hamiltonian evaluated
at the optimal policy.
V(Kt) is the total discounted utility for the representative agent. We
will refer to V as "welfare" though this definition of welfare is admittedly
oversimplified. Defining V as welfare, we see that NNP is proportional to
welfare, i.e., NNP is a welfare measure.
Weitzman also interpreted Yt* as NNP, and concluded that NNP pro-
portional to welfare. There is one problem with this interpretation. P t is
current prices measured in utility units, which is different from nominal cur-
rent prices. Thus Yt cannot be interpreted as nominal NNP. Real NNP on the
other hand is measured using a set of prices, po , from a base year. Thus yt*
cannot be interpreted as real NNP. This inaccuracy on the timing of prices
turn out to be an important problem for the theory.
Let us disregard this problem for a moment. How can a measure that
depends only upon the value of current consumption and investment reflect
the infinite stream of future utility? The answer is that we have assumed that
the representative agent have infinite horizon perfect foresight. His current
choice of consumption and investment reflects the value of alternative future
spending. Thus the assumption of perfect foresight is crucial. We have also
assumed that the agents do not die, but this assumption can be relaxed.
As shown in Barro (1974) it is possible to derive the same equilibrium if
the next generations utility is an argument in the current generation's utility
function. The model also assumes full certainty, but this assumption can also
be relaxed. For a further discussion on the properties of the market solution
under different assumption, see Blanchard and Fisher (1989).
To summarize this discussion we can conclude that the theory of NNP as
a welfare measure relies on very strong assumptions. On the other hand, is
it usually impossible to derive an empirical measure without strong assump-
tions. The purpose of this paper is, however, to show that even if we accept
these assumptions as a reasonable approximation of reality, the theory does
not prove that NNP is a welfare measure.
2.1 Net national product and the design of economic
policy
Welfare indicator is needed for evaluation of different economic policy pro-
posals. To formalize this idea, we have to introduce governmental decision
variables into the model. It is important for the proof of (3), that Kt and Ct
are optimal, hence the only place in the model where a governmental decision
variable can be introduced is the the production possibility set S(K).
Let Ot be the governmental decision variables at time t. Suppose that the
production possibility set is S(Kt ,Ot). Let 0 denote a path of O. The optimal
solution C* and K* will depend upon the economic policy. Let C;(0) and
KiK (D) denote the value of the optimal solution at time t given the economic
policy O. Suppose furthermore that the government wants to maximize total
welfare. Then e should be chosen to maximize V(Kt , 0). By (3),
msxV(Kt ,e) = max[f  max[r(0)]. (4)
t r e
Thus maximizing NNP, Yt*(0), is equivalent to maximizing V(Ift , 0). Note
that only Yt* is relevant for evaluating the policy O. The path of 17„* for s > t
is totally irrelevant, which I think is contrary to most economist's intuition.
Note, however, that in (2), S is independent of t, thus S(., O) should be
independent of t as well. This restriction excludes technical progress and
dynamic economic policy. That this restriction in fact is essential is demon-
strated by the following example, showing that when O is time dependent,
(3) is wrong.
Example 1. Consider an economy with aggregated production function,
f(Kt,Ot)= AK: + BOL , (5)
where 0 < a, b <1. Ot can be interpreted as the depletion of a finite publicly
owned resource. The stock of the resource is denoted Xt , and it = O. With
a linear utility the optimal capital path will be independent of the extraction
path 0, thus
Yt* = A(Kna Pt-kt + BO. (6)
Thus Yt* depends upon 0 only through et , which may even be chosen equal to
zero, while the rest of the path has obvious effects on the total welfare. This
demonstrates that the assumption of a stationary technology is essential. 13
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The following proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 1 In an economy with: a) infinite lived agents with perfect fore-
sight and where b) agents have linear utility, and the technology is stationary,
NNP is a measure of the discounted value of all future utility. Assumption
b) is essential for this conclusion.
To maximize welfare the government should choose a strategy that maxi-
mizes current net national product. The path of future development in NNP
is irrelevant.
The requirement of a stationary technology excludes considerations of
dynamic policy and economies with technical progress. In the following we
will only consider constant policies, denoted by 09 (instead of the path 0).
The conclusion that only one point of the NNP path is relevant runs
contrary to the standard intuition that economic growth is desirable. To
illustrate the intuition behind this result, consider the following example:
Example 1. (cont.) We can bring the problem in example one over to a
problem with constant policy, by assuming that the government decides the
extraction rate, and that only constant rates of extraction are allowed, i.e.,
the extraction is
Ot = d Xt, (7)
where Xt is the resource stock, and d < d < cl is the extraction rate. Letting d
denote the policy, we must consider Xt as real capital, and the dis investment
in resources must be added to Y. Still the rest of the economy will be
unaffected of the extraction path. Let kt denote the NNP in the case Xt = 0,
i.e. with no resources. Then net national product with resources (Xt > 0)
will be
Yt (d) = -I- B • Xtd — pt • Xtd (8)
It is easily derived that pi = :÷dd < B, and thus yta. is increasing in d. On the
other hand Xt is decreasing at the rate d, hence the growth rate of the econ-
omy is decreasing in the extraction rate, d. Thus if the government chooses
the policy to optimize the growth rate of the economy, it will choose d = d
which minimizes the social welfare! To maximize welfare the government
should choose d = j which minimizes the growth rate.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. With linear utility,
the resource should be extracted as soon as possible. Any delay will be a
loss, due to discounting. On the other hand, a rapid extraction of a finite
resource, must lead to a rapid fall in NNP towards the level corresponding
to no resource extraction.
2.2 Nonlinear utility with many commodities
In the previous section we assumed linear uti ity, and only one commodity.
A more general and reasonable assumption is to consider an economy with
many commodities and assume a non-linear iistantaneous utility function.




where Ct is a consumption vector.
To generalize Weitzman's result to this case, let eft = u(Ct), and define
the production possibility set:
,.;"(Kt , 0) = {(0t,kt)leit = u(Ct); (Ce, kt) E S(Kt ,O)}	 (10)
Now the competitive solution is formally equivalent to the solution above
with C and S replaced by C and S. Thus by Weitzman's result we know
that
7 (0) -I- pt (0).k* (t , 0) = r t c° 	(0)e-r (8_t) ds	 (11)
Note that both prices and quantities will depend upon the policy O. This
right hand side of this equation can be rewritten to:
rV(Kt , 0) = u(C7) ptdk* t 11:`	 (12)
Where .H;( is the Hamiltonian of the optimization problem. This equation
gives us immediately the following proposition.
Proposition 2 To measure the level of welfare, we should count the current
utility of consumption, not the consumption level. When the utility function
is unknown, the level of NNP gives no information about welfare.
3 Growth and marginal changes in welfare
It is unreasonable to assume that the utility function is known, thus the
previous proposition is a crucial objection against using level of NNP as a
welfare measure. On the other hand, the utility function can locally be ap-
proximated as a linear function. Thus it is natural to consider the possibility
that marginal changes in NNP is a measure of marginal changes in welfare.
By (12), and the equilibrium condition pit = fier-;;, the effect of a marginal
change in O is:
ay n E. aqt ak* apit ,..iti
r = rit(-5T-+--w)+ ao A Jao i=i
This gives a linear approximation of rif(Kt , 0), around a given policy 6:
rV(Kt , 0) rizd, fit -F ANNAO3t) APT&
where Ÿ. = rV(Kt , 6) and Íit is equilibrium prices at Õ. ANNP is changes
in net national product measured with jit prices. Note that if :175 = 0, the
last term in (14) vanishes, and changes in NNP is a measure of changes in
welfare. But is the assumption that S = 0 reasonable? Unfortunately not.
Consider a case where an increase in 0 will be equivalent to a technical
progress, but that only at a capital level higher than Kt , i.e. S(K, 0) is
independent of 0 for K = K. We will denote (AC, AK) as marginally
feasible if (C*, k*) a(Z1C, Ak) E S(Kt,6), for a sufficiently small. Since
C; and k; maximizes the hamiltonian within S(Kt , 6) for j3 given, we know
au 
AC + fitAk < O.	 (15)
OC
Since a change in 0 does not change S(K), the first order effect on (C*, k*)
must be marginally feasibles, and hence, ANNP O.
Still V(Kt , 0) must obviously be increasing in 0, since increasing O is
equivalent to a technical progress. Since Hi*, by (12) is equal to rV we
conclude that ApTif; > O.
Note that the essential assumption made in the argument above was that
S(K, 0) is independent of 0 for one point (K = Ks )) in the space of possible
capital vectors. Thus changes in NNP does not measure the effect of changes
(13)
(14)
in production possibilities outside this point. On the other hand, changes in
technology outside this point, is obviously important for changes in welfare.
Since changes in prices usually are second order effects that can be ignored
in a marginal analysis, it may seem contra intuitive at first glance that it is
the price changes that captures the welfare changes. The price changes would
have been a second order effect if we were considering a marginal exogenous
changes in investment and consumption, but in the analysis above we were
considering a marginal change in policy, 0, and this will have a first order
effect on both prices and quantities.
An alternative linear approximation of the welfare function will be useful
in the following. This can be derived by linearizing the utility function. Note
that the un observable term in (12) is u(Ct*). Thus alternatively we may use
a linear approximation of u. By a Taylor expansion of u we get:
n OU
U(C8) kdd U(C;) E	 (q) • (ci. -
i=i Cl
Using the equilibrium condition pit = --8-4--(C*) we get:t
rV(Ks) u(C7) NNP8,t (Pa — Pt)Ita
where NNI),,t is the net national product at time s measured by prices at
time t and its is average level of investment from time t to s.
We noted in section 2 that there was a problem in indentifying yt* as
either nominal or real NNP. An interesting observation at this point is that
NNP,,t corresponds to the real NNP, measured at time s with base prices
from time t. I will thus use the approximation in (17) in the following.
3.1 Evaluating NNP growth
In the case of linear utility we demonstrated that it may be optimal to mini-
mize economic growth. But in that example the resource stock was declining
over time, and we may expect welfare to decline as well. It may still be true
that changes in NNP over time is a measure of changes in welfare.
Equation (17) implies
r(V(If,) —V(Kt)) = NNPt,8 — NNPt,t -f- (Ps — Pt)Its.	 (18)
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It follows immediately that changes in NNP measures changes in welfare only
if shadow prices on capital are unchanged. We know that with changes in
policy from s ot t, we must expect prices to change, but what is the conditions
for constant shadow prices when the policy is unchanged?
Proposition 3 If the shadow price of investments is constant and economic
policy is unchanged, growth in welfare is proportional to NNP growth.
NNP will not measure the welfare effect of changes in S(K,O) outside the
current point in the capital space, i. e. for K Kt . Thus the theory gives no
justification of attempts to maximize economic growth.
How restrictive is the assumption that the shadow price on investment is
constant? From optimal control theory we knows that Ot = rpt — , where
Ht is the hamiltonian. In the one-good-case with linear utility and where
f(Kt ) = Ct kt , we have that NNPt = f(Kt), and thus Pa-fit., = f(Kt )pt , or
Jt = Pt(r — (Kt)). (19)
Thus the shadow prices of capital will not be constant until we have reached
the golden rule level of capital. But at that point there will be no changes
in NNP. On the other hand, if f'(Kt) r or It. 0, we may ignore the last
term in (18), and NNP-growth will be approximately proportional to welfare
changes.
3.2 Comparing NNP figures from different countries
Suppose that we are comparing the NNP development in two countries, which
start at the same NNP level in period t. Suppose furthermore that NNP is
growing faster in one countries than in the other. Can we conclude that the
government in the country with highest growth is using the best economic
policy?
Given our previous findings, a negative answer to should come as no
surprise. To demonstrate that the answer is negative, consider the case in
Example 1. Suppose that both countries have the same production function.
The only difference is that country 1 has reserves )(It that is higher than the
resource reserves for country 2, X2t. Suppose furthermore that d.Xit =
and that country 1 actually uses the policy d while 2 uses j. Then initial
NNP is equal, and as utility is linear, the two countries are initially equally
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well off though X1t > X2t. As 1 uses an inferior policy, her growth rate will
be highest.
Proposition 4 In comparing NNP between countries, differences in NNP
level doses not indicate differences in welfare level, and differences in NNP
growth do not indicate the relative success of the economic policy.
4 National wealth
To discuss possible definition of national wealth, we first have to know what
to mean by "wealth". The word is commonly used in financial economics. In
these applications the "wealth" has a very specific structure. If we can define
a national wealth with the same structure, we could use wealth management
results from financial theory, to evaluate the development in national wealth.
Let us thus first consider the structure of a financial wealth.
Let Pt be an n-dimensional vector of prices at time t on n different assets,
and let bt be the vector of dividends payed to the asset holders. Let Ot E Rn
be the number of assets an agent owns at time t. The wealth Wt is the total
value of all assets:
Wt = pOt
	 (20)
Prices and dividends are usually considered as exogenously given to the
agents, especially the value of the different assets is independent of the agent's
utility function.
The wealth is of no interest if we cannot spend it for consumption. An
agent holding Ot_ i assets when entering period t, and choosing the portfolio
et in period t, will get consumption Ct , given as:
at 	— et) + 6Tet-i	 (21)
Finally, explicit solution of wealth management problems usually requires
no restriction on Ot , except that wealth must be positive.
We have identified tree central properties of a financial wealth.
1. It is the total value of all assets.
2. It can be spent on consumption, and its size is independent of the
utility of the wealth owner.
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3. The owner of the wealth can determine how much on the wealth to
place on each available asset.
5 National wealth in an open economy
An example of an economic model where we can define a wealth with the
properties outlined in the previous section is the following.










-=	 (F (Kt, Xt) — It) - Ct
= (Be + At)(1
= d(Ift , Xt, it)
E M(Kt)
= Pe et  
(23)
limt > 0 
PT is the transposed of the vector of world market prices. ct is a vector of
consumption and Ct its value on the world market. At is net export. F(.,.)
is the production function where Kt is capital, possibly including natural
resources, and Xt is other variables, possibly extraction of resources, distri-
bution of total investment etc.. Bt is foreign bonds and It is total investment.
d(., .) is a function describing the dynamics of the capital accumulation pro-
cess. Finally is M(Kt) the set of possible values for Xt and I. We assume
that u(.) is strictly increasing.
Let J*, X* and C* be the optimal policy. Let K* be the corresponding
path of capital, and let ir; be income:
= g(F(1‘, Xr) —	 (24)
We can prove that 71-; is the path that maximizes net present value of
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future income, i.e. if ir is a feasible income path, theni
00 	 00
t=o	 t=o
it(1 + r) < _	 71(1 + r) t .	 (25)
The interpretation of this result is that in a centrally planned economy, the
government should choose production to maximize present value of future in-
come, the planner do not have to consider optimal consumption simultaneously. 2
We define national wealth at time t as:
00
	w t E 7;(1 + r)t-s + Bt	 (26)
a=t
It is easily seen from the equations above that:
	
Wt+i = (Wt — Ci )(1 -F r).	 (27)
There is no other restriction to the choice of Ct than Er...t a,(1 + r)t-• < Wt,
thus the nation is free to spend this wealth. Furthermore it is independent
of the utility function.
We define the aggregate utility function U as:
U( 	ci, ...) = s.t. p?' < Ct for t > 0
max u(co ,	 ...)	
(28)
We can then prove that the optimal consumption path is the one that max-
imizes U(Co, C1 , ...), subject to:
00
t=0 C
t (1 + r ) 	 1470
	 (29)
'This result is not deep. With dated commodities, the budget equation is pT c < pT y,
where p are prices, c consumption and y production, all of which are vectors in dated
and possibly state contingent commodities. With no interconnection between c and y it
is obvious that we should maximize pT y. The formulation in the text has the advantage
of being more specific on the definition of national wealth.
21n a decentralized economy we can prove a similar result by assuming that the gov-
ernment has to sets of instruments. One set solely affecting the production side of the
economy, while the other set solely affects the demand side. Then the optimal policy can
be found by first choosing production instruments to maximize the wealth. The govern-
ment do not have to consider demand side effects in this optimization. Then in the second
step the optimal demand side policy is chosen.
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We can now define the welfare function V as a function of wealth, by
V(Wo) = max U(Co, Ci , • • .)	 (30)
s.t. (29). If u is strictly increasing, V is obviously strictly increasing too.
Note also that if two countries have the same utility function3 , u, there
aggregated utility function V, will be equal too. This gives the following
conclusion.
Proposition 5 /n a small open economy, national welfare is an increasing
function of national wealth. Moreover, for two countries with equal utility
function, the country with highest per capital wealth has highest per capital
welfare.
6 National wealth in a large economy
In the previous section we considered an economy where all prices were exoge-
nously given. This is not the case for most national economies. Furthermore,
an important reason for the renewed interest in NNP as a welfare measure is
the possibilities of extending the definition of NNP to include changes in envi-
ronmental resources. But services from the environment, like unpolluted air,
are not tradeable, and hence prices will be determined domestically. Thus, it
is important to extend of Proposition 5 to economies where domestic supply
and demand effects prices. Unfortunately this is not possible.
Example 2 To illustrate the problem, consider an one period, two good
economy, where the price, pi , on good 1 is given exogenously, while good two
is produced and consumed domestically. Suppose the utility function of the
representative consumer is u = cm--, where ci is consumption of good i.
Since there is no trade in good two, y2 = c2 , and since the model is static,
the budge1 restriction implies Yi = cl . The equilibrium condition
p2= til2 1 — a Yi
Pi ill a Y2
guaranties that this is incentive compatible for a price taking consumer.
Using this equation, we can derive the following equation for the value of
total production:
3For countries with different utility function we cannot compare welfare anyhow.
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Yi Pl + Y2 • P2 Yi Pi. (31)
With only one period, the wealth is equal to the value of total production.
But, by this formula, the wealth is independent of the size of the production
of good 2. The reason for this is very simple. When prices are determined
domestically, the equilibrium price on good two is higher, the less the pro-
duction is. In this specific case, the two effects cancels out, leaving the value
of the production of good two independent of the size of the production.
This example demonstrates that economic welfare is not an increasing
function of wealth unless the economy is so small that all prices can be taken
as exogenously given. On the other hand, comparing wealth at the same point
in time, and the same set of prices but for different policies, is equivalent to a
cost benefit analysis. Under the assumption that makes benefit minus cost in
a CB analysis a welfare measure, changes in wealth is a measure of changes
in welfare. To extend this to changes in wealth from one year to an other,
other assumptions most likely have to be added. Furthermore, calculation in
Aslaksen et.al. (1990) shows that changes in wealth include a huge stochastic
term, independent of economic policy. A useful welfare measure would have
to correct for this. A throughout analysis of these problems are beyond the
scope of this paper.
7 Summary and Conclusions
Le us first summarize our findings before we turn to the conclusion about
NNP or wealth as welfare measures. Proposition 1 states that the assumption
of stationary technology is essential. This already excludes economies with
technical changes and consideration of dynamic economic policy. Some of
these problems my be overcome by introducing new capital component, e.g.
we may introduce technical change through human capital. These extra
capital components may be hard to measure. More important is the exclusion
of dynamic policy. It is hard to se how to resolve that problem.
Proposition 1 also states that under the assumption of stationary policy
and linear utility, the level of current NNP is proportional to welfare. We
noted that the result was unclear as to whether this referred to real or nominal
NNP.
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Proposition 2 states that the results derived under the assumption of
linear utility, cannot be generalized to non-linear utility. Thus generally the
level of NNP is not proportional to welfare. Even if we accept the discounted
value of future consumption as a reasonable concept of economic welfare, this
observation poses a problem.
Proposition 3 consider the possibility of using changes in NNP as a mea-
sure of changes in welfare. The proposition states that changes in real NNP is
proportional to changes in welfare only under the assumption that economic
policy is unchanged and that the shadow price of investments is unchanged
over time. Furthermore, most welfare effects of changes in economic policy is
not measured by changes in NNP. These conclusions are true even for linear
utility.
Finally, Proposition 4 states that comparing level or growth of NNP for
different countries, does not allow us to draw conclusion about relative welfare
or success of economic policy.
Given these results it is hard to see that NNP can be a welfare indicator
in any reasonable sense. Note however, that we do not claim that NNP is un
correlated to economic welfare. NNP is likely to be correlated to u(Ct), and
thus correlated to welfare as defined in this paper.
The last proposition states that in a small open economy, welfare is an
increasing function of national wealth. A small open economy is defined
as an economy where all prices are exogenously given. Unfortunately, this
assumption seems to be essential.
The ultimate critique of using NNP as a welfare measure, is to point at
a better alternative. Does there exist any better alternative? A national
economy is very complex. The changes in the economy from one year to
another range from unemployment, investment, productivity and technical
progress to changes in the environmental resource base. Moreover, closely
related to development in economic welfare are areas like culture, science or
crime. It is not at all obvious that it will make much sense to try to make one
measure that should account for total economic development. An obvious
alternative to NNP as a welfare measure is to have separate indicators for
consumption, development in environment and resources.
I will conclude by underlining that to let welfare only depend upon Ct is
an unreasonalby narrow concept of welfare. Important aspects of welfare are
disregarded, like distribution, unemployment, quality of environment, and
political freedom, just to mention some. Instead of searching for a single
16
indicator for this narrow concept of welfare, it would be more interesting to
discuss extensions of this concept (see Dasgupta (1991)), and to derive a set
of indicators for this extended concept of welfare.
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